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ON THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
THE CONCEPT OF INFERENTIAL UPĀDHI
Takanori Suzuki, Nagoya University
Abstract
It does seem certain, as prior research has suggested, that upādhi was given the role of “under-
cutter” in the Navya-nyāya theory of inference, and that the word “additional/associate condition,” 
which may lead us to misunderstanding, should be avoided in translations of the word, at least in 
the reading of Navya-nyāya texts. However, this is not the case for its early concept. In Vācas-
pati’s Tātparyaṭīkā, we can find this early concept of upādhi, which was developed through 
discussions between Naiyāyikas and Buddhist logicians on the ascertainment of causal relation-
ship. At this historical stage, upādhi had a meaning of an “associate factor necessary for the 
occurrence of x’s existence from y” rather than an “undercutting condition for the occurrence of in-
ferential knowledge of x from y.” Only in later texts, such as Udayana’s Pariśuddhi and Gaṅgeśa’s
Tattvacintāmaṇi, do we find indications that the word went through a historical process to eventu-
ally abandon this former aspect.
The Nyāya school, which mainly concerned itself with epistemology and logic, 
is generally considered to have established its theory of inference through a par-
ticular usage of the word “upādhi”. While the importance of understanding its 
concept has long been recognized among scholars who aim to investigate the 
Nyāya theory of inference, there has often been the misunderstanding that 
upādhi has the function of making an unsound inference sound by its addition to, 
or by its association with, a pseudo inferential mark. However, prior research has 
pointed out that the word itself does not actually have any sense of the factors 
“associate” or “additional” in the context of inference. Phillips, in his recent 
research on upādhiprakaraṇa in the TC (PHILLIPS 2002), evaluated “zusätzliche 
Bestimmung” or “additional condition” (FRAUWALLNER 1970 and VATTANKY
1984) and “associate condition” (MATILAL 1998) as “non-sensitive” translations 
by arguing that upādhi should be understood as something which blocks the 
occurrence of inferential cognition, or as a device to find a pseudo inferential 
mark. He eventually suggests an “undercutting condition” for the English trans-
lation, which seems to be widely accepted. Kitagawa (1965, 1966), Gango-
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padhyāy (1971) and Chakraborty (1978a, 1978b) dealt with this issue earlier 
than Phillips, although this translation had not yet been suggested by them. 
Recently, Sjödin (2006) dealt with the concept of the term in her investigation of 
the NL and its surrounding texts, against which Oetke (2009) critically re-
examined the specific key passages of the same text with more elaboration.
On the basis of the above prior achievement, this paper aims to clarify the 
historical change in the concept of upādhi. While investigation has so far mainly 
been based on Navya-nyāya texts, such as the TC, this paper introduces texts of 
earlier Naiyāyikas, such as Vācaspati and Udayana, to make clear the early 
concept of this word in the context of inference and examine inclusively how it 
has historically changed, making use of works dealing with the notion of natural 
relationship (svābhāvikasaṃbandha)1, which have a close link with the present 
issue and are indispensable for its investigation.
1. Prior Achievement and Points of Issue
Prior achievement and points of issue regarding the historical development of 
upādhi might be summarized as follows:
Etymologically, the word is analyzed into the particle ‘upa’ (signifying 
‘proximity’, samīpa) and ‘ādhi’ (signifying ‘to put’, from √dhā plus prefix ‘ā’), 
and meaning “to put near” or “that which is put near” as a whole. In the context 
of philosophy, however, this term is used in the sense of “imposing its property 
by being put near, or something which has its function” by derived meaning.2
According to the analogy of the crystal and the hibiscus, which has often been 
used among Indian thinkers, just as a hibiscus reflects its red color on a crystal 
when the former is put near the latter, upādhi imposes its property on another 
thing by being placed nearby.3 However, in the context of Nyāya theory of 
inference, especially that of the later Nyāya, the word hardly reflects its 
1 As examples, OBERHAMMER (1964), LASIC (2000) and FRANCO (2002) etc. can be listed.
2 TCD, p. 738, 11: “upa samīpavarttini ādadhāti svīyaṃ dharmam ity upādhiḥ.” etc.
3 TC, p. 266, 1–2: “atha upādhiḥ sa ucyate yaddharmo ’nyatra pratibimbate, yathā japākusu-
maṃ sphaṭikalauhitye upādhiḥ.” Udayana connects this analogy with the argument of infer-
ential upādhi in his NKus. NKus, p. 245, 24–26: “tatra upādhiḥ tu sādhanāvyāpakatve sati 
sādhyavyāpakaḥ. tat dharmabhūto hi vyāptiḥ javākusumaraktatā iva sphaṭike, sādhanābhi-
mate cakāstīti upādhiḥ […].” In this description, upādhi seems to be understood not as what 
is put near but as the function that it has. Etymological explanation of upādhi is mentioned 
in GANGOPADHYAY (1971: 147), CHAKRABORTY (1978a: 295), PHILLIPS (2002: 24–27).
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etymological meaning. It should be understood as “a symptom through which 
we can know the unsoundness of the argument” (KITAGAWA, 1965), “an under-
cutter which interrupts the occurrence of inferential cognition,” or “a defeater to 
point out pseudo inference mark” (PHILLIPS, 2002), not as “a thing to be added 
to” or “associated with” a pseudo inferential mark to convert it into a sound 
one. 4 Upādhi in this sense is typically defined as “sādhanāvyāpakatve sati 
sādhyavyāpakam” by some Indian thinkers.5
At least two questions can arise regarding the above:
1. There seems to be a considerable difference between the etymological 
meaning of the word and its later technical usage as an “undercutting con-
dition.” Most researchers broadly explain the earlier and more fundamental 
meaning of this term used in the context of inference, introducing the well-
known example of a pseudo inference of “smoke from fire”.? However, 
they do not seem to precisely investigate its earlier usage or seek the trace 
of its historical change in specific passages of texts. Thus, the historical 
background, in which the conversion from its original meaning to that of an 
undercutting condition occurred, has not been made clear.
2. Although “sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam” is the most pop-
ular definition in later Nyāya tradition, there were several others, one of 
which is “sādhyasamavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvam6”. They are 
largely different in the sense that an upādhi defined in the latter manner 
constitutes a possible sound hetu with respect to the sādhya, whereas 
upādhi that complies with the former definition does not possess this pro-
perty. That is to say, an upādhi which satisfies the former definition only 
4 KITAGAWA, 1965: 22; GANGOPADHYAY, 1971: 149; CHAKRABORTY, 1978a: 297; PHILLIPS,
2002: 27.
5 ATV, p. 863, 12, NKus, p. 245, 24, TR, p. 44, 2 etc. The definition “sādhyavyāpakatve sati 
sādhanāvyāpakaḥ”, which is considered to have the same content, appears in TBh, p. 45, 5–
6 and TS, p. 46, 20, etc. The TR’s description is obviously a quotation from the ATV as its 
commentary points out (TR, p. 44, 1–2: “anyatrāpy uktam – kaḥ punar upādhiḥ? sādhya-
prayojakaṃ […]. kim asya lakṣaṇam? sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam.”) It 
should be noted that Varadarāja presents, as his own opinion, another type of definition, i.e. 
“sādhanāvyāpakāḥ sādhyasamavyāptā upādhayaḥ” before this quotation.
6 TR, p. 42, 3. The NL gives a different type of definition which seems to be practically the 
same with this. NL, p. 502, 1: “kiṃ punar upādhitvam. sādhyakṛtsnasahacārinaḥ sādha-
naikadeśa- vṛttitvam.” It may be noteworthy that, in the MNU, a text of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃ-
sakas, the same type of definition is presented as their authoritative view. MNU, p. 28, 9: 
“sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāpta upādhi iti tasya lakṣaṇam.”
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precludes the soundness of some other hetu, but is not necessarily itself a 
sound reason with respect to sādhya and would not necessarily produce a 
sound reason by addition to an unsound hetu7. There has not been sufficient 
work considering this contradiction.
These two points will now be considered below.
2. Upādhi in the NVTṬ: Argument with Buddhist Logicians on the 
Determination of Kāryakāraṇabhāva
As is well-known, the word “upādhi” used in the context of inference first 
appears in a small fragment of Trilocana’s work 8 and later in the NVTṬ of 
Vācaspati9. Here, let us take an argument in the NVTṬ, through which we will be 
able to investigate the early concept of upādhi in more detail.
The term used in the context of inference appears within a discussion with 
Buddhist logicians regarding the determination of causal relationship (kārya-
kāraṇabhāva). For Buddhist logicians, who held causal relationship and identity 
(tādātmya) as the two grounds for inference, it became indispensable to make 
clear how these relationships are determined by the agent of inference. In the 
discussion regarding the former relationship, they argued that it is determined by 
special perception and non-perception10, and its knowledge can be described as 
“tadanantaram eva bhavati”. According to them, for example, the relationship 
between fire and smoke is determined as causal because smoke is seen only after 
fire.
To prove the above theory, Buddhist logicians took two steps of argument 
against Vācaspati. First, they denied the possibility that a visible factor such as a 
donkey, which may sometimes associate with fire, would be the cause of smoke 
on the basis that smoke can be seen not only after a donkey’s existence, but in its 
7 See Section 3 of this paper.
8 The fragment is found in the VC and VN. (VC, p. 161, 17–26; VN, p. 106, 16–26).
9 NVTṬ, p. 129, 2– p. 136, 17.
10 HB, p. 11, 5–7: “yathedam asyopalambhe upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ prāg anupalabdham 
upalabhyate, satsv apy anyeṣu hetuṣv asyābhāve na bhavatīti yas tadbhāve bhāvas tada-
bhāve ’bhāvaś ca pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ [...].” Buddhist argu-
ment regarding the determination of causal relationship has already been discussed in detail 
by KAJIYAMA (1963), LASIC (1997) etc.
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absence as well. Whether a donkey associates with it or not, smoke of the same 
kind can be seen when fire, with wet fuel (ārdrendhana), exists, and it cannot 
when fire does not.11 They next rejected the assumption that an invisible factor 
such as a ghost (piśāca), which can always associate with fire, would be the 
cause of smoke on the basis that smoke cannot be seen without fire. If, they said, 
the invisible factor is assumed to always associate with fire, then fire is thought 
to be the cause, just as fire is considered to be the cause even if fire is always 
associated with wet fuel when it produces smoke.12
In the above arguments presented by Buddhist logicians, a donkey, a ghost, 
and wet fuel are obviously used as factors which associate with fire. Among 
them, wet fuel is considered to be such a factor that makes the production of 
smoke from fire determinate. It is obvious that this argument of Buddhist logi-
cians became the background of the concept of inferential upādhi for Vācaspati, 
although wet fuel is not called upādhi in this argument. In the well-known 
passages of the NVTṬ, Vācaspati says as follows:
tasmād yo vā sa vāstu saṃbandhaḥ kevalaṃ yasyāsau svābhāviko niyataḥ, sa eva gamako 
gamyaś cetaraḥ saṃbandhīti yujyate. tathā hi dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādisaṃbandhaḥ svābhā-
vikaḥ, na tu vahnyādīnāṃ dhūmādibhiḥ. te hi vināpi dhūmādibhir upalabhyante. yadā tv 
ārdrendhanasaṃbandham anubhavanti, tadā dhūmādibhiḥ saha saṃbadhyante. tasmād 
vahnyādīnām ārdrendhanādyupādhikṛtaḥ saṃbandho na svābhāvikaḥ, tato na niyataḥ
[…].13
Therefore, it is reasonable to say that whatever the relationship may be, when one relatum is 
determined merely to be naturally related to the other14, the former becomes a gamaka and 
the latter gamya. To explain precisely, the relationship of smoke etc. with fire etc. is natural, 
but not the relationship of fire etc. with smoke etc. For (fire etc.) are seen without smoke 
etc., but, when fire etc. experience the connection (i.e. are connected) with wet fuel etc, they
become related to smoke etc. Thus, the relationship of fire etc., which is created by upādhi
11 NVTṬ, p. 130, 8–10: “atha tadanantaram eva bhāvaḥ. na ca rāsabhānantaraṃ bhavann api 
tadanantaram eva bhavati, tasmin saty apy asaty agnau tadabhāvāt. asaty api tasmin saty 
ārdrendhanavati vahnau tadbhāvāt.”
12 NVTṬ, p. 130, 19–131, 1: “yo yo dhūmo dṛṣṭaḥ sa sarvas tāvad ārdrendhanasahitavahnya-
nantaram eva na piśācānantaram [...]. yadi tu tan nimittaṃ kasmāt vināpi vahniṃ kvacid 
dhūmo nopalabhyate? athāsau sarvathā vahnisahitaḥ, tathā satyārdrendhanavat kathaṃ
vahnir api na kāraṇam?”
13 NVTṬ, p. 135, 8–12.
14 In his review of LASIC (2000), Franco suggested a reading where “niyata” in this passage 
should be interpreted in an epistemological sense and gave “restrictively determined” as its 
translation (FRANCO, 2002). I followed his suggestion here.
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such as wet fuel etc., is not natural and, accordingly, fire etc. are not restrictively determined 
to be naturally related to smoke etc. […].
As the expression “vahnyādīnām ārdrendhanādyupādhikṛtaḥ sambandhaḥ” 
simply shows, upādhi here should be understood as a “factor (or condition) by 
which a relationship between two relata is made to look natural” and “that 
which associates with a cause to produce an effect” as appeared in the argument 
of Buddhist logicians. It should not be understood as an undercutting condition. 
Upādhi in this sense, which can be found having almost a parallel structure with 
its etymological meaning (Figure 1 and 2), must be original in the context of the
theory of inference. 
However, we should not miss the fact that there is a significant shift of meaning 
of the term in this small passage itself. What Vācaspati intends in the above 
argument is that the Buddhist way of ascertainment of vyāpti is redundant.15
According to Buddhist logicians, since smoke is perceived to occur after fire 
with association of wet fuel, and smoke is not perceived to occur without fire in 
spite of the existence of wet fuel, it is determined that smoke is an effect, and 
fire is a cause, which means smoke is vyāpya and fire is vyāpaka; and, therefore, 
inference of smoke from fire is known to be possible. Whereas for Vācaspati, the 
fact that fire produces (or coexists with) smoke only with the association of wet 
fuel means that fire does not always produce smoke, which, for him, accordingly 
15  The above quoted passage is presented after the refutation against differentiating relation-
ships as inferential ground, i.e. two relationships by Buddhists, four by Vaiśeṣikas, and 
seven by Sāṃkhyas. It is thus to be understood that Vācaspati aimed here to present his 
theory that merely determinating whether the relationship is natural or not is enough for the 
one relatum to be a sound reason. cf.) NVTṬ, p. 131, 22– p. 132, 3: “astu tarhi saṃbandhaḥ
svābhāvikatayā anyānapekṣo ’vyabhicārī gamakāṅgam. sa ca yo vā sa vā bhavatu, kṛtaṃ
kāryakāraṇabhāvāvadhāraṇāyasena.”
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meant that cognition of fire does not always produce cognition of smoke. In his 
theory, then, what assures that cognition of x always produces cognition of y is 
the requirement that cognition of x can produce cognition of y even if it is not 
associated with another factor.
It is quite important here that Vācaspati identified the ontological event of 
fire producing smoke with the epistemological event. For Vācaspati, who 
preferred attributing universal concomitance (vyāpti) to the object of external 
sense organs16, there is no distinction between an ontological causal relationship 
between kāraṇa and kārya and a logical relationship between hetu and sādhya in 
the sense that the latter is also considered to be not a conceptualized mental 
event and exist in the outer world, as in the case of the former. Thus, according 
to him, wet fuel is an associate condition by which fire becomes able to produce 
smoke as an effect, which directly means that it is an undercutting condition, by 
cognition of which fire is known as what does not always produce cognition of 
smoke. Given this, it turns out that “upādhi as an additional or associate con-
dition” and “upādhi as an undercutting condition” are, as it were, opposite sides 
of the same coin.
3. Two Definitions of Upādhi in Udayana’s Work
Udayana, one of the biggest names of Indian philosophy, is considered also to be 
the first logician who gave a clear definition for inferential upādhi. In the ATV,
he presented this well-known definition which was inherited by the later Nyāya 
tradition, i.e. sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam (D1). This definition 
is preceded by another, sādhyaprayojakam nimittāntaram (D2), which is given 
as a reply to the question of what upādhi is. He says as follows:
kaḥ punar upādhiḥ? sādhyaprayojakaṃ nimittāntaram. kim asya lakṣaṇam. sādhanāvyā-
pakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam.17
16 It is well-known that Vācaspati added a slight but significant modification to Trilocana’s 
theory of grasping vyāpti. According to the latter, svābhāvikasaṃbandha, i.e. natural rela-
tionship, is to be grasped by perception via internal organs accompanied by repeated obser-
vation (bhūyodarśanasahāyamānasapratyakṣa). Vācaspati drew vyāpti more into the do-
main of perception by holding that it is grasped by perception via external organs with the 
aid of impression from repeated observation (bhūyodarśanajanitasaṃskārasahāyendriya-
pratyakṣa). cf.) VC, p. 131, 23, NVTṬ, p. 136, 22.
17 ATV, p. 863, 11–13.
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If we now symbolize the domain in which inferential marks exist as H, upādhis
as U, and sādhyas as S, and the fact that x resides in each of H, U, S respectively 
as Hx, Ux, and Sx18, we can draw Figures 3 and 4 as examples which satisfy D1. 
In these cases, upādhi can be an inferential “corrector”, which makes a pseudo 
inference sound by being added to an inferential mark (?x(Hx?Ux→Sx), Ha,
therefore Sa). However, since upādhi is required only to pervade sādhya but not 
to be pervaded by sādhya, according to this definition, it occurs, in some cases, 
that Hx?Ux does not logically lead to Sx (Figure 5). This fact is clear evidence 
that upādhi does not operate as a “corrector” by being added to a pseudo 
inferential mark as has been stated in prior research. 
H: the domain in which vahni exists
S: the domain in which dhūma exists
U: the domain in which ārdrendhana exists
?x(Hx?Ux→Sx)
H: the domain in which hiṃsātva exists
S: the domain in which adharmatva exists
U: the domain in which niṣiddhatva exists
?x(Hx?Ux→Sx)
18  It should be noted here that the symbols Hx, Ux, Sx cannot be verbalized as “x is H” and so 
on. As has been pointed out by some researchers, such as Wada, when an Indian syllogism 
is applied to the Venn diagram, H, etc. does not signify the group of hetu, etc. but the places 
in which hetus, etc. exist. In other word, for example, a statement “hetu is pervaded by 
sādhya”, in the context of Indian logic, means that “hetudharmin is subsumed by sādhya-
dharmin”, not that “hetudharma is subsumed by sādhyadharma”. Thus Hx, etc. should be 
verbalized “x resides in H.” Cf. WADA, 2007: 193–195. 
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U: sādhanāvyapakatve sati sādhyavyāpakaḥ
∃ x(Hx∧ Ux∧ ?Sx)
Taking the above into consideration, D2 turns out to create a contradiction with 
D1. For the word “sādhyaprayojaka”, which can be interpreted to mean that 
upādhi is “a factor/condition which prompts the production of the knowledge of 
sādhya,” requires the domain U to be pervaded by that of S at least in the 
domain of H, just as in the cases of Figures 3 and 4. In a word, upādhi should 
satisfy “sādhyasamavyāpakatva” to be sādhyaprayojaka.
In this connection, it should be recalled that Oberhammer once interpreted 
D2 as upādhi’s definition through its nature (Wesensdefinition) and D1 as the 
definition through its function (funktionelle Bestimmung). 19 Fundamentally 
following his achievement, Sjödin presented another interpretation that D2 is the 
ontological definition, whereas D1 is epistemological.20
Considering these instructive suggestions, we can now attempt to solve the 
contradiction between D1 and D2 through what has been concluded regarding 
the early concept of upādhi. In section 2 of this paper, it has been made clear 
that the original meaning of this term was an “associate factor/condition by 
19  OBERHAMMER, 1964: 167. 
20  It seems that she has obtained this idea through her investigation of a certain passage of the 
NL, which has closely similar structure with Udayana’s statement above. NL, p. 496, 1 – p. 
502, 1: “kā punar vyāptiḥ. sādhanasya sādhyasāhityaṃ kārtnyena, na punar anupādhitvam, 
anaikāntike sopādhitvodbhāvanāpatteḥ. nāpi sādhyābhāvavirodhaḥ. anvayini pratibandhā-
siddhiprāpteḥ. kiṃ punar asyā lakṣaṇam. anupādhikatvam. kiṃ punar upādhitvam. sādhya-
kṛtnasahacāriṇaḥ sādhanaikadeśavṛttitvam.” This passage is problematic in the sense that 
“anupādhi(ka)tvam” is first denied as the reply to the question regarding what vyāpti is, and 
is next accepted as its definition. Sjödin, who finds this passage parallel with the above Uda-
yana’s statement regarding upādhi, tried to interpret the former as an “ontological define-
tion” and the latter as an “epistemological one” (SJÖDIN, 2006: 124–130). Oetke, however, 
re-examined this passage, critically considering Sjödin’s interpretation. Although this issue 
may have a strong link with the main issue of this paper, I would like to refrain from 
considering it further here. 
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which sādhana (e.g. fire) prompts the production of the existence of sādhya (e.g. 
smoke) as its effect”. Presumably, the word “sādhyaprayojaka” should also be 
interpreted along this current. That is to say, the word “prayojaka” here does not 
signify a “prompter of occurrence of cognition” but a “prompter of occurrence 
of ontological effect”. In this interpretation, “another cause (nimittāntara)”, the 
other factor of D2, is found to be compatible with the whole definition. Thus, 
since prayojaka is thought to be used in the ontological sense of another cause, it 
does not seemingly need to always produce its effect to be called so, just as fire 
is eligible to be called cause even if it does not always produce smoke.21
4. Upādhi in Later Texts
Coexistence of the two different types of definition in the ATV seems to have 
caused a more or less confusing situation in later texts. Keśavamiśra, in his TBh,
paraphrases “upādhi” as “prayojaka” while he agrees with the D1 type of defi-
nition. However, in the explanatory process for identification of these two terms,
what he uses as an example of upādhi is “niṣiddhatva” in a pseudo inference of 
adharmatva from hiṃsātva, and “śākādyannapariṇatibheda” in a pseudo infe-
rence of śyāmatva from maitrītanayatva, in which upādhi appears as only 
sādhyasamavyāpaka (Figure 4) but not as sādhyavyāpaka.22 Thus, it cannot be 
concluded that he meant by the word “prayojaka” what Udayana must have in-
tended. In contrast, Maṇikanthamiśra clearly required prayojaka to be sādhya-
samavyāpaka in order for it to operate as it is expected.23
21 This reading is, however, not necessarily supported by later commentators. Śaṅkaramiśra’s 
Kalpalatā, p. 864, 3: “nimittāntaram iti. sādhyaprayojakāntaram ity arthaḥ. samavyāpyo-
pādhau tātparyam.” Bhagīratha’s Prakāśikā, p. 865, 6: “kaḥ punar iti. upādheḥ svarūpam 
āha. sādhyaprayojaka iti. yaddharmāvacchine sādhyasāmānādhikaraṇyam ity arthaḥ.”
22 TBh, p. 45, 4–11: “kratvantarvartinī hiṃsā adharmasādhanaṃ hiṃsātvāt kratubāhyahiṃ-
sāvat. tatra hy adharmatve hiṃsātvaṃ na prayojakaṃ kiṃ tu niṣiddhatvam eva. prayojakam 
upādhir iti yāvat. tathāhi sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhir ity upādhilakṣa-
ṇam.” Cf. TBh, p. 37, 5–14: “yady api yatra yatra maitrītanayatvaṃ tatra tatra śyāmatvam 
iti bhūyodarśanaṃ samānaṃ tathāpi maitrītanayatvaśyāmatvayor na svābhāvikaḥ saṃban-
dhaḥ, kiṃ tv aupādhika eva, śākādyannapariṇāmasyopādher vidyamānatvāt. tathā hi śyā-
matve maitrītanayatvaṃ na prayojakaṃ kiṃ ca śākādyannapariṇatibheda eva prayojakaḥ.
prayojakaś copādhir ity ucyate.”
23 NR, p. 80, 13 – p.81, 8: “nanu prayojako dharma upādhir ity ucyate. prayojakatvaṃ ca na 
nyūnādhikavṛtteḥ. kiṃ tu samaniyatasyaiva […]. samaniyatasyaiva dharmasya prayoja-
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Descriptions regarding this issue among later Naiyāyikas thus vary and 
seem to need more investigation. What is explicit, however, is that Gaṅgeśa re-
jected “sādhyasamavyāpakatva” as upādhi’s definition by advocating that it 
does not cover all cases of upādhi, which should operate as ‘defeaters of pseudo 
reason’. He says as follows in the section of pūrvapakṣa:
atha sādhyaprayojako dharma upādhiḥ. prayojakatvaṃ ca na nyūnādhikadeśavṛtteḥ. tasmin 
saty abhavatas tena vināpi bhavataḥ tad aprayojakatvāt […]. iti cet, na. dūṣaṇaupāyikaṃ hi 
prayojakatvam iha vivakṣitam. tac ca sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvam iti tad 
eva prayojakam, na tv adhikaṃ vyarthatvāt.24
Gaṅgeśa himself does not say clearly, but this discussion between pūrvapakṣin
and his objector presumably presupposes the above mentioned Udayana’s 
statement in the ATV. Or, it may even be assumed that this pūrvapakṣin is 
assigned as Udayana himself. At any rate, it is obvious here that Gaṅgeśa was 
recognizing that the word “sādhyaprayojaka” in D2 had a risk of establishing a 
contradiction with “sādhyavyāpakatva” in D1, since to be sādhyaprayojaka
might require one to have sādhyasamavyāpakatva (na nyūnādhikadeśavṛtti). 
Thus, he tries here to make pūrvapakṣin avoid its contradiction by having him 
regard “prayojaka” as a “device which prompts (objectors) to refute a pseudo 
reason (dūṣaṇaupāyika)”.25 We are able to see, in this passage, the fact that 
upādhi was diluted from its original meaning and came to be confirmed as an 
“undercutting condition”, which had already been implied by Udayana’s defi-
nition, “sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvam”.26
________________________________
katvam ity atra prayojakatvaṃ kiṃ vyāpakatvam? vyāpyatvam? ubhayaṃ vā? ādye viṣama-
vyāptasyāpi vyāpakatvād anaikāntikatvam. dvitīye ’pi tathaiva. na hi samavyāptam eva
vyāpyam. tṛtīye samavyāptam eva samavyāptam ity uktaṃ bhavati.” Cf. FRAUWALLNER,
1970: 31.
24 TC, p. 265, 1–5. A similar argument can be found in the NR. See above.
25 “Sādhyasamavyāpakatva” is already denied as a factor of upādhi’s definition before this 
passage due to the same reason. TC, p. 234, 4–7: “nāpi sādhyasamavyāptatve sati sādha-
nāvyāpakavam upādhitvam. dūṣakatābījasya vyabhicāronnayanasya satpratipakṣasya vā 
sāmyena viṣamavyāptasyāpy upādhitvāt. tathā dūṣakatāyāṃ sādhyavyāpyatvasya aprayo-
jakatvāc ca.” Although this statement appears under the advocation of pūrvapakṣin, Gaṅ-
geśa’s stand point does not differ from this. Frauwallner finds “sādhyasamavyāpakatve sati 
sādhanāvyāpakatva” obsolete at the time of Gaṅgeśa (FRAUWALLNER, 1970: 30).
26 Gaṅgeśa himself seems to have accepted “paryavasitasādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyā-
pakatvam” as standard definition of upādhi. TC, p. 284, 1.
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5. Conclusion
The meaning of the word “upādhi”, used in the context of inference, was pre-
sumably “a factor/condition by which a relationship between two relata is made 
to look natural” and “that which associates with a cause to produce an effect” at 
its starting point. Its usage can be seen, in the NVTṬ, in the discussion between 
Naiyāyikas and Buddhist logicians regarding the determination of causal rela-
tionship. However, due to the epistemological characteristic of Vācaspati’s
theory, which attributes logical relationship to a fact occurring in the outer 
world, the term converted its original meaning into “a condition by cognition of 
which one relatum is known as what does not always produce cognition of the 
other relatum”.
One of Udayana’s definitions in his ATV, “sādhyaprayojakam nimittānta-
ram,” seems to keep the ontological aspect of the word “upādhi” that it original-
ly had. However, the word “sādhyaprayojaka,” which can be read as “prompter 
of cognition of sādhya”, caused the possibility that the later Naiyāyikas would 
interpret it to mean “an additional or associate condition which makes a pseudo 
inference sound”, although Udayana, who clearly defined it as “sādhanāvyāpa-
katve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam”, himself recognized that its function does not 
reside in this point.
Gaṅgeśa interpreted “sādhyaprayojaka” in the epistemological sense, much 
like the other later Naiyāyikas. However, he explicitly avoided the possibility 
that “sādhyaprayojaka” would be “sādhyasamavyāpaka” by giving it the mean-
ing “a device to refute a pseudo inference.” At this historical point, upādhi was 
diluted from its original meaning and confirmed as an “undercutting condition”.
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